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Using company level data from 17 countries that have su¤ered a currency crisis during the past decade,
this paper documents that …rms have increasing leverage and declining pro…tability prior to a crisis. After
sorting companies into two groups based on their exchange rate beta, we show that companies that bene…t
from currency depreciations have higher leverage, lower earnings to revenue ratios and lower interest
coverage ratios compared to …rms that are harmed by currency deprecations. These results are consistent
with the recent literature that puts the …nancial policies and performance of corporations as the central
issue in currency crises.
KEYWORDS: currency crises, corporate leverage, capital structure, pro…tability, exchange rates.
JEL classi…cation: F3, F4, G3Are currency crises caused by irresponsible macroeconomic policies? The answer used to be an un-
quali…ed yes: a currency crisis was a just retribution for government mismanagement. However, the recent
crisis in Asia has led many observers to question this view. Most of the a-icted economies had budget
surpluses and healthy foreign exchange reserves. While current account de…cits were large in some coun-
tries (Thailand and Malaysia), they were very modest in others (South Korea and Indonesia). Thus it is
di¢cult to argue that currency depreciations were needed because of macroeconomic reasons.
This paper contributes to the growing literature that places the corporate sector and its policies as the
central issue in currency crises. In order to examine the role of corporations and their policies in currency
crises, this paper considers micro level data of those countries that have su¤ered a currency crisis in the
last ten years. We compile a database that contains data on …rms in seventeen countries. We analyze the
…rms’ …nancial policies and pro…tability ratios First we sort companies into two groups using individual
companies’ stock market returns. In the …rst group we have companies whose stock returns decrease when
the domestic currency appreciates with respect to the U.S. dollar (negative exposure companies) and in the
second group those companies whose stock returns increase (positive exposure companies). After sorting
the companies into these two groups, we show that those companies with negative exposure have higher
leverage than those companies that have positive exposure, even tough all companies increase their leverage
prior to a currency depreciation. In addition, we analyze companies pro…tability and liquidity using several
standard ratios, and show that pro…tability decreases for all companies before a currency crisis, but the
e¤ect is more pronounced for the negative exposure companies. We also show, in a multivariate regression
framework controlling for …rm characteristics, that companies that bene…t from a currency depreciation
have higher leverage than companies that are harmed by the depreciation.
We also examine how …rms’ leverage a¤ects the amount of currency depreciations. We …nd that it is
especially the leverage of negative exposure companies that a¤ects the magnitude of currency depreciations.
Finally, we argue that countries with the weakest corporate governance mechanisms are more prone for
this phenomenon of excessive leverage leading to a currency depreciation because of forced reliance on debt
in …nancing investments. We operationalize this by using the variables developed by La Porta et. al. in
addition to leverage ratios to explain the magnitude of currency depreciations.
The results of this paper provide support for the implications derived in Bris and Koskinen (2001),
who argue that excessive leverage and risky investments among exporting companies lead to currency
depreciations. Aghion et al. (2000) and Krugman (1999) also argue that …rms’ …nancial distress is the
important factor causing currency crises. Shocks (or loss of con…dence) cause depreciations which then
cause …nancial distress problems for corporations and further depreciations. The hypothesis underlying
1such argument is that currency depreciations decrease …rms’ pro…tability. In order for these models to
hold empirically, one would expect the increase in leverage and decline in pro…tability be more pronounced
among positive exposure …rms. Our data doesn’t support that.
In addition to these …nancial distress models, Johnson et al. (2000) emphasize problems in corporate
governance as an explanation to the Asian crisis and show that lack of outside investor protection is re-
lated to the amount of depreciation in emerging markets. We obtain results, consistent with Johnson et
al. (2000), and we are able to provide an alternative explanation for these …ndings: poor corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms lead to forced debt …nancing and thus, through high leverage, ultimately to currency
depreciations1.
There are several other papers that depart from the traditional macroeconomic reasoning in explaining
currency crises. Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a, 1998b, 1999) argue that creditors’ capital was
at least implicitly guaranteed in some Asian countries, if …nancial di¢culties were to arise. This would
naturally lead to overinvestment in risky projects at the expense of safer ones. Chang and Velasco (1998a,
1998b) model a currency crisis in a same way as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model a bank run. With
foreign borrowing and a …xed exchange rate, a run on banks becomes a run on the currency. In Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (1999) out‡ow of capital can lead to domestic …re sales, because a country has a lack
of international collateral, thus deepening a capital account crisis to a full …nancial crisis. Allen and Gale
(2000) argue that currency crises can serve as a risk sharing mechanism between domestic bank depositors
and international bond markets
The next section of the paper describes the data and its sources. In Section II we analyze the stock price
reaction of the companies in our sample to a currency depreciation, based on our measures of exchange
rate exposure. In Section III we study the relationship between leverage and exchange rates. In Section
IV we relate exchange rate exposure to several di¤erent measures of pro…tability. In Section V we provide
cross-sectional evidence on the determinants of a company’s capital structure and on the amount of a
currency depreciation. Section VI concludes the paper.
I Data
A Sample description
1Mitton (2001) provides company level evidence, that corporate governance variables also help to explain how individual
companies performed in the Asian crisis.
2Throughout the paper, a crisis is de…ned as the event in which a government decides to let its previously
…xed currency ‡oat or administratively devalues it. We only consider currencies that can ‡oat within a
band or that are …xed. Bands can be either nominal or real, so crawling peg currencies are also considered
…xed for our purposes.
We obtain information about currency crises that have occurred in the period 1985-2000. These are
partly compiled in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). Additionally, Italy, the United Kingdom and the
countries that experienced the Asian crises of 1997 are also included in the sample. When a country has
su¤ered several crises in the period 1985-2000 (this is the case, for instance, for Brazil, Chile, Spain, and
Turkey), exclusively the last one is considered. The …nal sample of crises includes seventeen countries,
and its description is in Table I. There have been other major currency depreciations not included in the
…nal sample for a variety of reasons. For example, we do not include the Russian crisis in 1998 because of
a lack of data on Russian …rms. We also eliminate Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Peru, and Uruguay,
because we lack stock price data before the crises. For some countries the most recent crisis has not been
considered due to the unavailability of data after the crisis2. Brazil, for instance, su¤ered its last crisis in
1999. Finally, some Asian countries, like Japan, that experienced considerable depreciations did not have
a system of …xed rates prior to the crises.
For each country in the sample, Datastream provides a Global Market Index, that includes a varying
number of …rms per country3. Datastream also provides accounting information regarding all the available
…rms in the corresponding market, for a window of …ve years around the year of the currency crisis.
We are able to …nd information in Datastream for 3,617 …rms from the seventeen countries we consider.
Among those, 2,081 …rms are from Asia4, 1,403 from European countries, and 133 …rms from Latin America.
We compare the number of …rms in our sample with the total number of …rms in the corresponding exchange
as of December of the corresponding crisis year, from the International Federation of Stock Exchanges.
On average, our sample contains 54.75 percent of all the …rms listed in a country’s main stock exchange.
This percentage is lower for Latin American countries, where currency depreciations happened earlier and
2We require six years of past information, and two years of post-crisis data, on stock prices for the …rms available in the
sample in order to perform the estimation.
3There are 50 stocks from Brazil, 50 from Venezuela, 90 from Mexico, 50 from Finland, 50 from Norway, 120 from
Spain, 70 from Sweden, 50 from Turkey, 550 from the UK, 160 from Italy, 50 from Indonesia, 100 from South Korea, 90
from Malaysia, 50 from the Phillippines, 100 from Singapore, 70from Taiwan, 50from Thailand, included in each market index.
4Pomerleano, with a sample of …rms that include Japan and Hong Kong, employs data from 734 companies.
3hence the lack of data problem is more severe.
[Insert Table IA]
In Table IA we have calculated the domestic stock market return at the time of the currency deprecia-
tion, as well as in the …ve months that surround the crisis. On average stock prices decline by 1.83% in the
month following the depreciation month. We also calculate the currency depreciation relative to the US
dollar5. At the same time, the average currency depreciation in our sample amounts to 27.01 percent in the
5 months that surround the crises. The largest depreciation happened in Brazil (94.7 percent), the lowest
in Venezuela (3.56 percent appreciation in …ve months). The average debt-to-value ratio (book values) for
the total sample is 51.2 percent, with South Korea having the highest ratio (75.18 percent), and Brazil
the lowest (25.15 percent). By regions, Asian countries display the highest debt levels, with an average of
57.68 percent. European countries had a 45.81 percent debt ratio and the average for Latin America is
31.52 percent.
Table IB describes the exchange rate regimes for the countries in our sample. Strictly speaking, only
Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines had …xed exchange rates prior to their currency devaluations. In
addition to the countries in the ERM, Finland, Norway and Sweden maintained the exchange rate within
a band with respect to the ECU. Other countries (South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, and Taiwan) …xed
their real exchange rates with respect to either the dollar or a basket of currencies. Malaysia and Venezuela
allowed for ‡uctuations with respect to the dollar. Figure 1 shows that, although pegged to the dollar,
Latin American currencies were the ones that ‡uctuated the most before the crises. Brazil pegged the real
only six months before its last devaluation, and Mexico su¤ered several crises before the ones we consider
in this paper. Asian exchange rates are not excessively volatile in the last six years before the crises (the
standard deviation of the monthly change in exchange rates is 0.84 percent in Asia, 1.54 percent in Europe,
and 5.52 in Latin America).
[Insert Table IB]
[Insert Figure 1]
In the next section we survey the literature on exchange rate exposure and propose a new methodology
that allows us to di¤erentiate …rms depending on whether they bene…t from or are harmed by currency
depreciations. We regress the stock return of every …rm on exchange rate changes and the component of
the domestic market return that is orthogonal to the changes in the exchange rate.
5Throughout the paper, exchange rates are calculated as units of dollars per domestic currency.
4II Exchange rate exposure
For the past twenty years, …nancial researchers have paid a great deal of attention to how to measure a …rm’s
exposure to exchange rate movements. The basic models can be grouped into two categories: accounting
- based exposure and stock price - based exposure. The studies by Claessens et al. (1998) and Allayannis
(1996) belong to the …rst group. They respectively use the percentage of exports on sales, and the ratio
of net exports to sales as a measure of a …rm’s exposure to currency risk. In our framework, however, we
encounter three problems with this methodology: …rst, as Allayannis et al. (2000) show, exporting …rms
were the ones that hedged the most prior to the Asian crises of 1997. This means that the percentage of
exports is not a good measure of exchange rate exposure for Asian countries. The second problem is lack of
data. The number of …rms for which data on exports is available is reduced in emerging markets6. Finally,
it is possible that a …rm that only operates in the domestic market is nonetheless exposed to exchange rate
risk, if competitors are foreign …rms that sell to the country where the domestic …rm operates7. Therefore,
movements in the exchange rate a¤ect the competitiveness of the domestic …rm and therefore its pro…ts.
Among the studies that focus on stock price - based exposure, Jorion (1990, 1991), Bodnar and Gentry
(1993), and Amihud (1994) regress a company’s stock return on exchange rate changes and additional
control variables such as a market portfolio return8.
Jorion (1991) uses a two-factor model, with the value-weighted stock market return as the …rst factor
and the orthogonal component of innovations in a trade-weighted exchange rate as the second factor. The
orthogonalization eliminates spurious pricing of the exchange rate factor because of a possible correlation
between exchange rate and market return.
Finally, Bodnar and Wong (2000) suggest that the inclusion of a market portfolio increases the precision
of the residual exposure estimates. However, if the market portfolio has a non-zero exposure, including a
market portfolio as a regressor shifts the distribution of the residual exposure estimates with respect to
the total exposure counterparts. Therefore residual exposure estimates re‡ect the deviation of the …rm’s
6In their paper on the Asian crises of 1997, Allayannis et al. (2000) are able to …nd data on exports only for the largest
50 companies in each country.
7For example, shipbuilders in China argued for a devaluation of the renminbi in 1998, since Japanese and South Korean
shipbuilders became more competitive as a result of the 1997 crises (Financial Times, July 6, 1998).
8In the early studies of Dumas (1978), Adler and Dumas (1984) and Hodder (1982), exposure was measured by the
regression coe¢cient of the real value of the …rm on the exchange rate. Although these models are easy to implement, they
…nd the percentage of …rms with a signi…cant exposure to exchange rate movements to be low.
5exposure from the market’s portfolio exposure. As most studies use a value-weighted portfolio, dominated
by large …rms with a more negative exposure to exchange rate movements, the residual exposure estimates
su¤er from a positive shift. The solution the authors suggest is the use of an equal-weight market portfolio
to correct for the correlation between …rm size and the sign of the exchange rate exposure.
.1 An alternative approach
We measure the exchange rate exposure by partly following the methodology in Jorion (1991). However,
our procedure is exactly the opposite of Jorion’s: in explaining individual companies’ stock returns, we
use as regressors the change in exchange rate and the component of market return that is orthogonal to
the change in exchange rate. By using this methodology, we are able to circumvent the critique made by
Bodnar and Wong (2000). Hence we are able to estimate which companies have a negative and positive
exchange rate exposure in absolute sense, and hence do not have to rely on estimates of currency exposure
that are calculated relative to the market as a whole.
First we estimate the following regression for each country in our sample:
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where Rij is the stock return of …rm i in country j, Rj
x is the monthly change in the exchange rate in
country j, and Fj
m is the estimated orthogonal component for market j. The estimated ¯
x
i are, as stated,
measures of …rm i’s exposure to exchange rate risk. Additionally, to avoid non-synchronous movements in
exchange rates and stock returns, we use monthly data.
In Table II we show for each country the average exchange rate beta and the orthogonal market beta,
as well as the each individual market exposure coe¢cient to exchange rate movements, following the
methodology outlined above. The average exchange rate beta is the size-weighted average of the exchange
rate betas calculated for the …rms in a particular country. The market exposure is, for every country, the
estimate of ° in the regression (1).
6Ten countries in our sample have a negative exchange rate exposure. All European countries, except
Turkey, have a negative value for °1, whereas in all Asian countries, except for the Philippines and Thailand,
°1 is positive. In Thailand, for instance, the country exposure is ¡7:042 . Indonesia, in the other extreme,
displays a country exposure of 4.607.
[Insert Table II]
We expect exporting …rms to display a negative exchange rate beta, while domestic …rms should have
a positive exposure. Seoul Foods, for instance, a South Korean …rm that manufactures bread and snack
foods (arguably a non-exporting …rm) has a beta of 2:509. An exporting …rm such as Shin Corporation9,
from Taiwan, has a beta of ¡7:5041. The results for the average market betas are consistent with Bodnar
and Wong (2000), since we …nd markets to be exposed to currency movements.
Therefore, and in the absence of data on the structure of the balance sheet for each …rm, we are able
to characterize every …rm in the sample into two categories depending on its exposure to exchange rate
movements: …rms that bene…t from currency depreciations, and …rms that su¤er from depreciations. It
is worth noting, that exporting …rms may have an insigni…cant exchange rate beta if they hedge their
currency exposure. However, this is consistent with the argument in this paper: so exporting …rms that
hedge their currency exposure shouldn’t have an incentive to increase their leverage prior to a currency
crisis.
We rank …rms in a particular country by their exchange rate beta. Firms are not comparable in terms of
exchange rate exposure across countries. Therefore we rank each …rm with respect to the other companies
in the same country by splitting the sample between …rms with negative and positive exchange rate beta.
In the next sections, we analyze the stock price reaction to a currency crisis, and the di¤erent e¤ects
of the currency depreciation on …rms depending on whether the …rm has negative or positive exposure to
currency movements.
III Stock price e¤ects
A good test of the outlined methodology is to analyze stock price e¤ects around the currency depreciation
for …rms with positive and negative exchange rate beta. One expects …rms with negative exchange rate beta
9Shiang Shin Corporation, located in Taiwan, is engaged in the manufacturing and exporting of Nitrile Gloves, Latex
Surgical Gloves, Latex Examination Gloves, Vinyl Examination Gloves and other Disposable Medical Products. Its main
markets are in the U.S.A., Europe, Australia, Japan, Central & South America.
7to react positively to the currency crisis, since their revenues increase (either because they are exporting
…rms, or because their competitors have an opposite exposure to the exchange rate).
We follow the standard procedure of estimating b ²ijt = Rijt ¡
h
b ®i + b ¯
m
i Rmjt
i
; where b ®i and b ¯
m
i are the
estimates in the regression Rijt = ®i + ¯m
i Rmjt + ²ijt. The estimation is performed for a window running
from t = ¡72 to t = ¡36 months relative to the depreciation month for each country. Results are reported
in Table III, where we display cumulative abnormal returns for di¤erent subperiods around the crises. For
the overall sample (4;607 …rms), the announcement return (two months around the date of the currency
depreciation) is -6.7, signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the one percent level. In Table IA, we report a
1.83 percent negative market return at t = 0. Across regions, the CAR at from t = ¡1 to t = +1 is ¡6:55
percent in European countries, -8.15 percent for the Asian economies, and -5.83 percent for Latin America;
with the three coe¢cients signi…cant at the 1 percent level10. Harvey and Roper (1999) show that in Asian
markets there is a consistent pattern of stock price declines prior to the devaluation. However, they focus
on raw returns rather than CARs.
[Insert Table III]
Interestingly, we …nd a distinctive pattern of returns for negative and positive exchange rate beta …rms
in the period following the currency depreciation. For the whole sample, negative beta …rms display a
positive CAR of 373.24 percent, and a negative 92.73 percent for the group of positive exchange rate
beta …rms (only the former signi…cant at the one percent level). The same pattern is found in Europe:
negative exchange rate beta …rms bene…t and positive exchange rate beta …rms su¤er from the currency
depreciation. Likewise, in Asia negative exchange rate beta …rms are the ones that bene…t the most from
the currency depreciation
IV Firm leverage and exchange rate exposure
In this section we empirically test the hypothesis that …rms display increases in leverage prior to currency
depreciations. Furthermore, we sort …rms into two groups based on their exchange rate exposure. The
rationale for di¤erentiating between companies based on their currency exposure is that …rms that bene…t
from a currency depreciation may have an incentive to increase their leverage, because if the risks of high
10Additionally, the sample of European …rms include a majority of …rms with negative exposure to exchange rates. Bartov
and Wong (2000) show that if the market portfolio has a non-zero exposure to exchange rate movements, the distribution of
returns shift with respect to the total market exposure. Therefore, we expect negative CARs for European …rms.
8leverage materialize, the …rms expect a currency depreciation as a form of a bailout (see Bris and Koskinen,
2001).
We focus on a sample of countries that have su¤ered currency crises since 1985 and analyze the …nancial
policies of …rms in those countries depending on their currency exposure. The testable hypothesis outlined
above implies that, prior to a currency depreciation, we should observe an increase in corporate borrowing,
and a decline in pro…tability.
We obtain data from Datastream on each …rm’s debt-to-value ratio11. The debt-to-value ratio is ana-
lyzed in the last three years preceding the currency devaluation, as well as two years after the devaluation.
We gather data on a …rm’s total debt-to-value ratio, as well as on the percentage of short-term debt to
total debt.
[Insert Table IV]
[Insert Table IV-B]
The Results are in Tables IV, IV-B and V. In Table IV we analyze changes in leverage prior to the
crises; in Table IV-B we show the same results disaggregated at the country level. We …nd that …rms that
bene…t from a currency depreciation (those with negative exchange rate beta) increase their debt-to-value
ratios 3.42 percent in median (signi…cant at the one percent level) in the three-year period that precedes
the devaluation, while …rms that su¤er from a depreciation increase leverage by 3.55 percent (signi…cant
at the one percent level). Negative exchange rate beta …rms increase their leverage more than positive
exchange rate beta …rms in Europe (3.77 percent versus 1.4 percent) and Latin America (3.54 percent
versus and insigni…cant 0.43 percent). The result is reversed for Asia, negative exchange rate beta …rms
increase their leverage by 2.69 percent; positive exchange rate beta …rms do so by 4.25 percent. A two-
tailed Wilcoxon rank test reject the hypothesis that increments in leverage prior to a currency depreciation
di¤er for negative and positive exchange rate beta …rms. However, we see that for Europe and Asia (and
for the sample as a whole), the debt-to-value ratio is signi…cantly higher for negative exchange rate beta
…rms than for positive exchange rate beta …rms three years prior to the devaluation, and the di¤erence
persists in the devaluation month.
In the two years that follow the devaluation, positive exchange rate beta …rms increase their leverage
signi…cantly more than negative exchange rate beta …rms (2.15 percent for positive ERB …rms; negative
11Throughout the paper, we consider the debt-to-value ratio as the object of study. The results do not change qualitatively
when we use the debt-to-equity ratio instead.
9ERB …rms do not change their debt levels in the two years that follow the crises). This result is driven
by Asian …rms (3.58 percent for positive ERB …rms; 1.58 for negative ERB …rms). Leverage, however,
continues to be higher for negative exchange rate beta …rms, especially in Asia.
On country level, we …nd that …rms in Finland, Spain, UK, Mexico and most Asian countries (with
the exception of Thailand and Philippines) increase their leverage prior to a currency crisis (signi…cant
increases at the 1% level) Finland and Korea have especially high leverage before their currencies were
devalued (65.39% and 58.68% debt-to-value ratios, respectively), while in Sweden and Turkey the negative
ERB …rm had a considerable higher leverage than positive ERB …rms.
[Insert Table V]
We also analyze the changes in short-term debt ratios. Results are in Table V. For the overall sample, the
median short-term debt to total debt ratio does not change signi…cantly around the currency depreciation.
The countries in our sample were mostly …nanced with short term debt prior to the crises. We …nd
short-term debt ratios of 62.63, 52.83 and 54.8 per cent in Asia, Europe and Latin America respectively.
Our results are consistent with Pomerleano (1998), Harvey and Roper (1999), and Claessens et al.
(1998). Pomerleano (1998) documents the rapidly increasing debt ratios in Asia, specially short-term,
from 1992 to 1996. However, he does not provide a disaggregated analysis by …rm characteristics. Harvey
and Roper (1999) report that the median leverage ratio across the 261 …rms in their sample was 68.6
percent in 1992, and 114 percent in 1996. The leverage increase was mostly short-term again. In Claessens
et al. (1998), Asian …rms also display increasing debt ratios, and their data suggest that the ratio of short
term debt to total debt in the Asian economies was signi…cantly larger than in the US or Germany (the
median short-term debt share increases from 47.26 percent in 1988 to 60.43 percent in 1996; this ratio is
25.9 percent in 1996 in the US, 45.3 percent in Germany).
In general, these results con…rm that …xed exchange rate economies display increasing corporate leverage
prior to a currency depreciation, particularly among companies that bene…t from currency depreciations.
To what extent the excess leverage induces currency crises will be the objective of Section V. In the next
section we analyze alternative measures of performance, pro…tability and investment.
10V Other Variables
A Pro…tability
Harvey and Roper (1999), Claessens et al. (1998), and Pomerleano (1998) report a signi…cant decline
in pro…tability in Asian economies prior to the 1997 crises (decreasing Return on Assets in Claessens et
al., 1998; declining Return on Equity in Harvey and Roper, 1999; and decreasing Return on Equity and
Return on Capital Employed in Pomerleano, 1998). We want to examine whether this result extends to
other regions and whether it is uniform across …rms with di¤erent characteristics.
[Insert Table VI]
We obtain data on two measures of pro…tability (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes over Total Rev-
enues, and Return on Capital Employed). Results are in Tables VI and VII. We do …nd signi…cant declines
in pro…tability under both measures and in the three regions under consideration. For the overall sample,
the EBIT to revenues ratio decreases by 13.57 percent. This decline is more severe for negative ERB (-15.08
against -8.18 per cent for positive ERB …rms, signi…cantly di¤erent at the 1 per cent level). The other
measure of pro…tability we use, the return on capital employed, leads to the same conclusion: the ROCE
decreases by 27.9 percent for the overall sample, 28.6 for negative ERB …rms and 23.69 for positive ERB
…rms. Following the devaluation, both measures of pro…tability show that negative ERB …rms perform
better than positive ERB …rms in Asia.
[Insert Table VII]
B Financial Fragility
Radelet and Sachs (1998) blame …nancial panic as a cause of the East Asia crises of 1997. They identify the
ratio of short-term debt to foreign exchange reserves as an indicator of a country’s risk. Having short-term
debt in excess of foreign exchange reserves could have triggered a crisis in the same way as in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) the inability of banks to face their short-term payments creates a bank run. Radelet
and Sachs (1998) report that this ratio was above one for Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea prior to
1997. However, it was also below one for some other countries a¤ected by the crises, such as Taiwan and
the Philippines.
We study …nancial fragility in a similar fashion to Radelet and Sachs (1998), except that we use …rm
level data. In our analysis, the current ratio measures the ability of a creditor to pay o¤ its short-term
11debts. The current ratio is calculated as current assets to current liabilities, and it re‡ects the current
liquidity of the …rm. Pomerleano (1998) argues that this would be a good measure of a …rm’s …nancial
fragility, although the ratio is not reported in his study.
[Insert Table VIII]
We report in Table VIII the current ratio for 2;907 …rms in our sample. For the overall sample, the
ratio falls from 1.38 to 1.33 in the three years preceding the corresponding crises (a signi…cant 4.57 percent
in median), consistent with the country level results in Radelet and Sachs (1998). The evolution of the
current ratio di¤ers across …rms. While negative ERB …rms decrease their current ratio by 4.8 percent
(signi…cant at the 1 percent level), the change for positive ERB …rms is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero.
For the US, the current ratio for the total sample of Compustat …rms ( 5;108 …rms with data available)
in the years 1995 through 1998 is respectively 3.29, 3.70, 4.04, and 3.34. It compares to an average ratio of
1.33 for our total sample of 2;907 …rms at the onset of their respective crisis. So we can conclude that …rms
in countries that su¤ered currency crises showed early warnings of distress. It is also signi…cant that after
the crises, …rms’ fragility increases even further (-3.43 percent for the overall sample, signi…cant at the 1
percent level), with positive ERB …rms showing the worst performance (a signi…cant 7.91 decline against a
2.12 decline for negative ERB), two years after the currency crises. The increase in …nancial fragility after
the crisis is due to Asian …rms, while the …rms in Europe show increasing current ratios.
[Insert Table IX]
Table IX complements the previous result. We display the interest coverage ratios for the …rms in the
sample, and …nd a clear deterioration of the solvency of the exporting sector prior to the onset of the
corresponding crises. For the overall sample, the interest coverage ratio decreases by 35.68 percent in the
three years preceding the currency depreciation. Negative exchange rate beta …rms experience a decrease
of 37.21 percent in their interest coverage ratio, while …rms with a positive exchange rate beta decrease
their interest coverage ratio by 28.77; both coe¢cients are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 1 percent
level. More importantly, we should note the situation of virtual bankruptcy of negative ERB Asian …rms
prior to the devaluation, with an interest coverage ratio of only 1.00.
It is also interesting to note that for the overall sample, the interest coverage ratio increases (18.44
percent) during the two years following the currency crises. This result holds for both types of …rms,
12but is larger for negative ERB …rms (21.34 against a 6.44 percent increase). At the regional level, we
observe important di¤erences. While for Asian …rms the interest coverage ratio deteriorates in the two
years that follow the crises for both types of …rms, in Latin America and Europe the increase in the interest
coverage ratio is larger for positive ERB …rms, although the di¤erence is not signi…cant at the ten percent
level. Analysis of the interest coverage ratio reveals thus the special characteristics of the Asian crises with
respect to the turbulences in Europe and Latin America.
C Investments
We analyze the investment policies in our sample of …rms from three di¤erent regions by obtaining data
on changes in total assets. In Table X we summarize changes in net investments measured by changes in
total assets for a period of …ve years.
[Insert Table X]
Overall, companies invest 62.41 percent less than they did before the onset of a currency crisis. Negative
exchange rate beta …rms have a larger decrease than positive exchange rate beta …rms (67.46% decline
compared to 47.89% decline). Firms in Asian and Latin American countries display signi…cant higher
investment rates compared to European …rms. Claessens et al. (1998) report, in line with our results,
relatively higher investment rates (measured as new dollar investments as a share of existing …xed assets)
in Asian …rms than in U.S. and German …rms.
D Summary of the …ndings
Our analysis suggests that …rms in countries that have su¤ered dramatic exchange rate depreciations in the
last decade, follow a similar pattern of investment and …nancial policies. We have documented a signi…cant
decline in pro…tability in the corporate sector, that it is more accentuated for those …rms with negative
exposure to exchange rate movements. Although investment rates are declining, companies still increase the
size of their total assets. This results suggests that corporations must rely on external …nancing to engage
in new investments. As shown in Tables IV and V debt, either long- or short-term, is the more likely source
of …nancing. Whether debt …nancing arises as an optimal instrument because of the underdevelopment of
equity markets, or because …rms …nd it optimal to lever up when exchange rates are …xed and devaluations
are possible, will be studied in the next sections.
We document an increasing …nancial fragility (measured by the ratio of current assets to current
liabilities). Other studies have shown the same pattern (Pomerleano (1998), Harvey and Roper (1999)).
13Tables IX additionally shows a signi…cant decline in the coverage ratios in countries su¤ering currency
depreciations.
In the next section we analyze …rst whether micro variables (the …rm’s exposure to exchange rates
being the most important one) a¤ect the extent of a country’s currency depreciation. Then we study
cross-sectionally the determinants of a …rm decision to rely on debt …nancing when exchange rates are
…xed and depreciations are possible.
VI Cross-sectional analysis
A Firm leverage and currency depreciations
The argument made in Bris and Koskinen (2001) is that small, exporting countries where the corporate
sector displays declining pro…tability, are more likely to su¤er currency crises when the exchange rate is
…xed and the government cannot commit ex-ante not to let the currency depreciate. Firms in these …rms
tend to rely heavily on debt …nancing, since through currency depreciation the costs of …nancial distress
are passed on to the economy as a whole.
We therefore test directly the previous hypothesis by focusing on the seventeen countries that su¤ered
a currency crises included in our sample. The endogenous variable in our regressions is the exchange rate
change in the two months that surround the currency crisis. The magnitude of this variable is obviously
negative for the countries in our sample, and lower the more severe the crisis was. Johnson et al. (2000)
measure the severity of the Asian crises with the nominal exchange rate depreciation from the end of
1996 to January 1999. The countries in our sample have relatively …xed exchange rates over the sample
period, so a better measure of the crises is the currency depreciation once the government support of
the currency is abandoned. Secondly, using the debt-to-value ratio as an explanatory variable of the
currency depreciation over a long horizon creates causality problems, that we avoid by measuring the
currency depreciation in a di¤erent subperiod. Finally, the amount of depreciation at t = 0 is not a good
measure of the total depreciation; South Korea, for instance, let the currency ‡oat three months after
the …rst speculative attacks against the won started (after repeated interventions by the Central Bank
of Korea, South Korea abandoned its defense of the battered won on November 17, 1997). Additionally,
most currencies depreciated dramatically in the months following the crisis12. We show the values of this
12The Indonesian central bank widened the rupiah trading band from 12 percent to 8 percent in July 1997. The band was
…nally abandoned in August 14, and in the next two months the rupiah lost 25:35 percent with respect to the dollar.
14variable in Table I. On average, depreciation amounts to 27.01 percent in a period of …ve months.
The results in the previous sections show that countries that su¤ered currency crises display signi…cant
increases in corporate debt-to-value ratios. We intend to analyze whether the corporate sector contributed
to the severity of the crisis with high levels of leverage. We di¤erentiate between …rms with negative and
positive exchange rate sensitivity by calculating the weighted average debt to equity ratio for …rms in either
group. That is, for every country we calculate:
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x denotes a …rm’s exchange rate beta, and wi is the company’s average sales in the three
years that precede the corresponding currency crisis. Note that, within a country, the weighted average
debt-to-equity ratio can be written as:
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that is, we decompose the average leverage into two components: one attributable to …rms with negative
ERB, and the other corresponding to …rms with positive ERB.
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that laws a¤ecting investor protection have consequences for corporate
…nance. We therefore control in our analysis for di¤erences in e¢ciency of the judicial system, rule of
law, corruption, and risk of expropriation across countries. Those variables are averages calculated over
di¤erent time horizons, so their interpretation must be taken with caution. For instance, the e¢ciency
of the judiciary system is calculated by La Porta et al. as the average between 1980 and 1983, while the
currency crises we consider date from 1992. In our regressions, we employ the complete time series of data
that they use in their paper13, and calculate the …ve year average prior to the corresponding currency crisis
date. Comparing the mean values of the variables in our sample with all the countries considered by La
Porta et al. (1998) we do not observe dramatic di¤erences (the mean values for the variables ‘E¢ciency of
13We are grateful to Florencio López de Silanes for providing us with these unpublished data.
15the Judicial System’, ‘Rule of Law’, ‘Corruption’, and ‘Risk of Expropriation’ are 7.10, 6.78, 6.59, and 7.96
for our sample, and 7.67, 6.85, 6.9, and 8.05, for a total sample of 49 countries). Johnson et al. (2000) …nd
that these four measures of legal institutions predict the changes in exchange rates in emerging markets
better than the standard macro measures. They report a negative relationship between these variables
and the currency depreciation from 1997 to 1998 (low values for ‘Corruption’, and ‘Risk of Expropriation’
mean respectively high levels of corruption and expropriation risk). We control as well for the country’s
GDP. In terms of GDP, the recent currency crises have a¤ected to relatively small European countries,
and large Asian and Latin American Economies.
[Insert Table XI]
We provide di¤erent speci…cations due to the reduced number of degrees freedom. In Panel I we only
make use of capital structure and corporate governance variables. The results in Models I and II provide
empirical support to our claim that the relevant factor in explaining the severity of a currency crisis is not
the average debt to value ratio, but the debt to value ratio for …rms with negative exposure to exchange
rate changes. Even when we control for the variables in La Porta et al. (1998), the average debt to value
ratio is of the wrong sign (Model III) or is only marginally signi…cant (Model IV), whereas this parameter
is signi…cant for negative ERB …rms (at 10% level in Model V and at 1% level in Model VI).
In Panel II, we add two macroeconomic variables to our analysis, budget and current account de…cits
relative to the GDP. We observe that the average debt to value ratio lacks explanatory power (Models VIII
and X); whereas the coe¢cient for the negative ERB debt to equity value is signi…cant at the 10 percent
level in Model XII. The GDP and budget de…cit one year prior to the crises are signi…cantly di¤erent from
zero across di¤erent model speci…cations. The results are mixed for the current account variable. We
see in Table XI that the coe¢cients of the variables E¢ciency of the Judicial System, and Rule of Law
are negative14, consistent with the results in Johnson et al. (2000). We also …nd that smaller countries
depreciated their currencies the most.
B Firm leverage and currency exposure
We complete the cross-sectional analysis by testing whether …rms’ currency exposure measured by their
exchange-rate betas a¤ects …rms’ …nancing policies prior to a currency depreciation. If …nancial distress
14A negative coe¢cient for a given variable implies that larger variables of that variable are associated with less severe
currency depreciations.
16is likely to induce a government to let the currency depreciate as a way of bailing out companies, then
we should expect …rms that bene…t the most from a currency depreciation to have a higher leverage than
companies that su¤er from depreciation prior to a currency crisis.
We test this extreme by performing a regression analysis at the …rm level where the explanatory
variable is the …rm’s debt-to-value ratio (book values) as of December prior to the corresponding currency
crisis. The set of explanatory variables includes the …rm’s exchange rate beta, calculated over a window of
t = ¡60 to t = ¡24 months relative to the event month. We also use as explanatory variables the measures
of corporate law from La Porta et al. (1998) described in the previous subsection. Rajan and Zingales
(1995) argue that highly levered companies are more likely to give up pro…table investment opportunities.
Hence, growth opportunities (proxied by the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets)
should be negatively related to debt-to-equity ratios. We calculate the average market to book ratio in the
three years preceding the currency crises for 4,232 …rms in our sample.
In Rajan and Zingales (1995), size is measured by the logarithm of sales. They obtain a positive
coe¢cient in their regressions, although, in their view, a negative relationship between size and debt levels
is sensible if size is also a proxy for the information outside investors have. Our measure of size is a three-
year average of a …rm’s sales in the three years before the relevant currency depreciation. Additionally,
and despite disagreeing theoretical predictions regarding the e¤ect of pro…tability on leverage, they …nd a
negative relationship between EBITDA (normalized by the book value of assets) and book debt-to-value
ratios. Our measure of pro…tability is EBIT normalized by total assets. We further control for the log of
the GDP per capita in dollars.
[Insert Table XII]
The results from the regression are reported in Table XII. For the total sample (1.601 …rms with
data available), we …nd results consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995), since pro…tability and size
have respectively negative and positive coe¢cients in general. We also …nd, consistent with the results in
Tables IV and V, that Asian …rms display, prior to the crises, relatively higher levels of debt than those in
European and Latin American …rms.
Finally, and focusing on the coe¢cient for the exchange rate beta, we consistently …nd a negative
relationship between a …rm’s exposure to exchange rate movements and book leverage.
17VII Conclusion
This paper uses company level data from seventeen countries that have su¤ered a currency crisis during
the past decade. Companies are sorted into two groups depending on whether they bene…t from or are
harmed by currency appreciations. The sorting is done using companies individual stock returns that
are regressed on their home currency’s movement against the U.S. dollar and on the part of market
return that is orthogonal to the currency movement. Using this grouping we are able to show that there
are di¤erences in companies’ leverage and pro…tability depending on their exchange rate beta. While
leverage increases and pro…tability declines for all companies, these e¤ects are more pronounced for negative
exchange rate beta companies. Moreover, controlling for …rm characteristics, the …rms that bene…t from
currency depreciations also have higher leverage prior to a crisis than …rms that are harmed by currency
depreciations. Finally, the amount of currency depreciation is positively related to leverage in companies
that bene…t from depreciations.
Whether the corporate sector’s choice between foreign and domestic debt a¤ects the probability and
the severity of currency crises is still an open question. The measure of leverage that is reported in this
paper does not distinguish among di¤erent sources of debt …nancing. Neither does this paper consider the
di¤erence between debt issues and stock repurchases; both increase the debt-to-equity ratio. Disaggregated
data on debt …nancing for emerging and developing economies such as the ones that we consider are
not easily available, so indirect measures are necessary. The analysis, however, would have interesting
implications, and deserves further research.
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 Market Currency Currency
Devaluation Firms in Main Percent Return Depreciation Depreciation Average
Country Month ( t = 0) N. Obs. Exchange in Sample t=0 t = 0 t=-2 to t=+2 Leverage
Total 3,617 7,729 46.80% -1.83% -19.31% -27.01% 51.20%
 
Brazil March, 1995 15 570 2.63% -13.09% -46.29% -94.70% 25.15%
Mexico December, 1994 29 206 14.08% -4.54% -35.03% -42.47% 39.39%
Venezuela December, 1995 7 159 4.40% 8.37% -41.52% 3.56% 29.95%
United Kingdom September, 1992 1,191 2,440 48.81% -3.38% -8.41% -15.85% 29.34%
Spain May, 1993 88 379 23.22% 4.86% -8.64% -10.88% 43.16%
Finland September, 1992 24 62 38.71% -15.74% -14.17% -13.22% 59.97%
Italy September, 1993 14 259 5.41% 8.27% -3.24% -11.42% 42.49%
Norway December, 1992 49 123 39.84% 15.72% -7.88% -20.31% 50.33%
Sweden November, 1992 82 205 40.00% 5.11% -19.84% -31.35% 28.18%
Turkey March, 1994 37 176 21.02% 14.65% -55.05% -72.13% 50.77%
Indonesia August, 1997 165 281 58.72% -8.35% -17.80% -34.02% 52.57%
South Korea November, 1997 713 776 91.88% -17.25% -49.84% -54.64% 75.18%
Malaysia July, 1997 367 703 52.20% -6.08% -9.42% -16.99% 38.21%
Philippines July, 1997 153 221 69.23% -4.68% -9.09% -19.72% 28.96%
Singapore July, 1997 209 334 62.57% -4.77% -5.05% -4.86% 36.23%
Taiwan October, 1997 320 404 79.21% -7.65% -7.97% -14.23% 34.03%
Thailand July, 1997 154 431 35.73% 29.46% -22.16% -27.31% 55.43%
Table IA. Sample Description.
This table displays the number of firms in the sample, number of firms in the corresponding exchange, market return in the
devaluation month, and currency depreciation in the crisis month and around the crisis month; and average leverage. Average
leverage is the weighted average (by size) of the debt-to-value ratio for all firms in each country. The sample includes all firms
with available information in Datastream for seventeen countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000.
Stock returns, Exchange rates, Market Returns and accounting variables are from Datastream. The number of firms in the main
exchange is as of December of the corresponding crisis year, and it is obtained from the International Federation of Stock
Exchanges’ web page, at www.fibv.com/stats/ta11.xls. 
Brazil  Fixed against the dollar six months before the crisis. 
Spain  The exchange rate is maintained within a margin of ±15 percent around the bilateral central rates against other 
participating currencies, with the exception of Germany and the Netherlands, in which case the exchange rate is 
maintained within a margin of ±2.25 percent. 
 
Finland  Unilaterally pegged to Ecu. 
Indonesia  Explicit real exchange rate targeting with the nominal rate falling from 1900 rupieh to the US $ in 1990 to 2400 by the 
beginning of 1997 
 
South Korea  The Korean won followed periods of fixity to the US $ but had a more flexible exchange 
rate regime. The Won depreciated in nominal terms from 1990 until the beginning of 1993 (from 700 to almost 800 won 
per dollar). Next, it traded in a very narrow range of 800 to 770 won/$ between the beginning of 1993 and the middle of 
1996. Then, it started to depreciate by about 10% reaching a rate of 884 at the end of 1996 
 
Mexico  Fixed peso-dollar exchange rate 
Malaysia  A 10% range of 2.7 to 2.5 ringitt to the US$ for most of the years between 1990 and the beginning of 1997 
Norway  The krone was first pegged to the Ecu on October 19, 1990, within a margin of ±2.25 per cent from a fixed rate of 
NKr7.9940 per Ecu. 
 
Philippines  The Peso fluctuated in a 15% range of 28 to 24 between 1990 and the beginning of 1995 but was 
practically fixed at a 26.2 rate to the US dollar from the spring of 1995 until the beginning of 1997 
 
Sweden  Behaved as an ERM country, although not officially in the system. 
Singapore  The currency actually appreciated in nominal terms throughout the 1990s going from a rate of 1.7 in 1990 to a rate of 1.4 
by the end of 1996. 
 
Italy  The exchange rate is maintained within a margin of ±15 percent around the bilateral central rates against other 
participating currencies, with the exception of Germany and the Netherlands, in which case the exchange rate is 
maintained within a margin of ±2.25 percent. 
 
Taiwan  Real exchange rate targeting allowing its currency to fall from a rate of 24 New Taiwan dollars per US$ in 
1990 to a rate of 27.8 by the end of 1996. 
 
Thailand  The Thai Bath was effectively fixed in a narrow 25.2 to 25.6 to the US$ from 1990 until 1997 
Turkey  Managed floating exchange rate. 
United Kingdom  The exchange rate is maintained within a margin of ±15 percent around the bilateral central rates against other 
participating currencies, with the exception of Germany and the Netherlands, in which case the exchange rate is 
maintained within a margin of ±2.25 percent. 
 
Venezuela  The exchange rate is maintained within margins of ±7.5 percent. 
 
Table IB 
Exchange Rate Regimes in countries that have suffered Currency Crises 
The Table describes the Exchange Rate Regimes of seventeen countries that have suffered currency crises 
since 1990. The description corresponds to the regime prevailing one month prior to the last currency 
depreciation considered in Table 1.  
Source: Nouriel Roubini, “An Introduction to Open Economy Macroeconomics. Currency Crises and the 
Asian Crisis”, in  http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/NOTES/macro5.htm#9, and Lexis-Nexis 
   Average Average Country
Country N Exchange Rate Market Exposure
Beta Beta % Firms % Significant % Firms % Significant
Total 3,617 0.301 0.814   53.71% 4.15% 46.29% 5.02%
 
Brazil 15 -1.362 -0.991 -1.322 33.33% 20.83% 66.67% 13.16%
Mexico 29 21.040 0.369 -2.221 82.76% 10.00% 17.24% 16.00%
Venezuela 7 0.925 0.523 2.259 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 42.86%
United Kingdom 1,191 -0.030 0.959 -0.472 84.89% 9.97% 15.11% 6.13%
Spain 88 2.580 0.926 -0.821 64.77% 5.45% 35.23% 10.53%
Finland 24 0.010 1.059 -0.201 66.67% 21.05% 33.33% 15.79%
Italy 14 -0.380 0.896 -0.263 71.43% 9.38% 28.57% 13.82%
Norway 49 -0.350 0.941 -0.621 69.39% 10.00% 30.61% 6.25%
Sweden 82 -0.200 0.852 -1.189 78.05% 10.91% 21.95% 20.75%
Turkey 37 -0.470 1.080 0.897 10.81% 14.29% 89.19% 7.04%
Indonesia 165 1.710 0.911 4.607 28.48% 35.42% 71.52% 6.67%
South Korea 713 0.050 0.738 1.262 79.24% 9.71% 20.76% 2.30%
Malaysia 367 0.890 1.152 0.633 44.96% 0.69% 55.04% 6.25%
Philippines 153 -0.340 0.516 -0.695 37.25% 11.90% 62.75% 7.46%
Singapore 209 -0.820 0.835 0.228 83.25% 10.71% 16.75% 19.47%
Taiwan 320 0.260 0.897 0.853 68.13% 9.09% 31.88% 3.57%
Thailand 154 1.140 0.821 -7.042 9.09% 15.14% 90.91% 9.52%
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
   
Negative
Exchange Rate Beta
Positive
Exchange Rate Beta
Table II. Exchange rate beta.
The third and fourth columns of this table display the average exchange rate beta and market beta for
countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. The fifth column displays the
country exposure coefficient to exchange rate movements. This coefficient is calculated as follows. For
every country in our sample, we estimate the regression  st st o mt R R n g g + + = 1 , where mt R is the
corresponding market return, and  st R  is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate
the  g coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency
depreciation month. The last four columns show the percentage of positive and negative ERB firms  for
each country and for the sample  as a whole. Stock returns, Exchange rates, Market Returns and accounting
variables are from Datastream.    
Exchange
Region Rate N p-value p-value p-value p-value
Beta
Total   4,607 -15.95% *** (<0.0001) 31.83% *** (<0.0001) -6.70% *** (<0.0001) 58.96% *** (<0.0001)
 
Negative 3,103 27.08% *** (<0.0001) 223.53% *** (<0.0001) -40.84% *** (<0.0001) 373.24% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 1,501 -36.72% *** (<0.0001) -60.70% *** (<0.0001) 9.78% *** (<0.0001) -92.73% *** (<0.0001)
Europe   2,150 -12.70% *** (<0.0001) 36.64% *** (<0.0001) -6.55% *** (<0.0001) 64.09% *** (<0.0001)
 
Negative 1,705 35.40% *** (<0.0001) 243.37% *** (<0.0001) -42.88% *** (<0.0001) 400.64% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 445 -36.91% *** (<0.0001) -67.39% *** (<0.0001) 11.74% *** (<0.0001) -105.26% *** (<0.0001)
Asia 2,335 -46.04% *** (<0.0001) -12.86% *** (<0.0001) -8.15% *** (<0.0001) 11.74% *** (0.0030)
 
Negative 1,330 -80.89% *** (<0.0001) -33.67% *** (<0.0001) -14.53% *** (<0.0001) 18.47% *** (0.0025)
Positive 1,005 -35.04% *** (<0.0001) -6.30% *** (0.0008) -6.14% *** (<0.0001) 9.61% * (0.0905)
Latin America 119 -51.97% *** (<0.0001) -10.82% *** (0.0045) -5.83% *** (<0.0001) -74.27% *** (<0.0001)
 
Negative 68 -17.43% ** (0.0153) -4.96%   (0.2787) -5.11% *** (0.0001) -6.28%   (0.6228)
Positive 51 -66.08% *** (<0.0001) -13.21% ** (0.0292) -6.12% *** (0.0016) -102.02% *** (<0.0001)
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
From t=-36 to t=-13 From t=-12 to t=-2 From t=-1 to t=+1 From t=+2 to t=+36
CAR CAR CAR CAR
Table III. Stock Market Effect.  
This table displays the Cumulative Abnormal Returns from 36 months prior to the currency depreciation up to 36 months after the crisis, for a 
sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. ‘Europe’ includes firms from Finland, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. ‘Asia’ includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 
‘Latin America’ includes firms from Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is 
calculated as follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression  st st o mt R R n g g + + = 1 , where mt R is the corresponding market 
return, and  st R  is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the  g coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to 
month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate  ( ) st 1 o mt mt R ˆ ˆ R F g + g - =  from the previous regression, and use the 
estimated residual in the regression  t ij t m
m
i t s
s
i o t ij j j F R R e + b + b + d = , where  ij R  is the stock return of firm I in the country j,  sj Ris the monthly change 
in the exchange rate in the country j, and 
j m F is the residual for market j. The measure of firm i's exposure to exchange rate risk is  s
i b .Stock returns, 
Exchange rates, Market Returns and accounting variables are from Datastream. 
Table III. Stock Market Effect.  
This table displays the Cumulative Abnormal Returns from 72 months prior to the currency depreciation up to 36 months after the crisis, for a 
sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. Cumulative Abnormal Returns are value weighted, with 
weights determined by the average market value (in dollars) from t=-72 to t=-36 relative to the crises date. ‘Europe’ includes firms from Finland, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. ‘Asia’ includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan 
and Thailand. ‘Latin America’ includes firms from Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate 
beta, which is calculated as follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression  st st o mt R R n g g + + = 1 , where  mt R is the 
corresponding market return, and  st R  is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the  g coefficients using monthly data 
from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate  ( ) st 1 o mt mt R ˆ ˆ R F g + g - =  from the previous 
regression, and use the estimated residual in the regression 
t ij t m
m
i t s
s
i o t ij j j F R R e + b + b + d = , where 
ij R  is the stock return of firm I in the country j, 
sj R is the monthly change in the exchange rate in the country j, and 
j m F is the residual for market j. The measure of firm i's exposure to exchange 
rate risk is  s
i b .Stock returns, Exchange rates, Market Returns and accounting variables are from Datastream.  
       
Exchange Rate
Region Beta N t = - 3 t = - 2 t = - 1 t =  0 t = + 1 t = + 2 p-value p-value
Total   3,617 31.51% 33.78% 35.48% 37.11% 40.48% 37.89% 3.45% *** (<0.0001) 0.94% *** (<0.0001)
Negative 2,465 32.43% 35.07% 37.50% 38.27% 41.52% 38.27% 3.42% *** (<0.0001) 0.00% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 1,152 29.08% 30.07% 31.03% 34.64% 37.89% 37.50% 3.55% *** (<0.0001) 2.15% *** (<0.0001)
(0.0004) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (0.0054) *** (0.3662) (0.7633)   (<0.0001) ***
   
Europe   1,403 27.01% 31.03% 31.51% 31.03% 31.03% 30.07% 3.57% *** (<0.0001) 0.00% (0.6077)
   
Negative 1,132 27.54% 31.03% 31.97% 31.51% 31.51% 30.07% 3.77% *** (<0.0001) 0.00% (0.6394)
Positive 271 23.08% 27.80% 28.06% 29.82% 29.08% 28.06% 1.40% ** (0.0122) 0.00% (0.8319)
(0.3834) (0.0444) ** (0.0350) ** (0.2587)   (0.2947) (0.3779) (0.3118)   (0.8678)  
Asia   2,081 37.89% 37.89% 40.48% 42.53% 48.98% 46.81% 3.32% *** (<0.0001) 2.28% *** (<0.0001)
   
Negative 1,240 41.52% 41.86% 45.95% 46.81% 53.05% 49.50% 2.69% *** (<0.0001) 1.58% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 841 31.51% 31.51% 33.33% 37.11% 42.53% 43.18% 4.25% *** (<0.0001) 3.84% *** (<0.0001)
(<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (0.0002) *** (0.2827)   (0.0010) ***
   
Latin America   133 22.78% 20.00% 21.88% 23.94% 26.20% 28.57% 2.65% * (0.0567) 4.45% *** (0.0002)
   
Negative 93 24.81% 21.57% 23.08% 27.79% 29.58% 31.97% 3.54% ** (0.0486) 4.46% *** (0.0007)
Positive 40 20.64% 17.36% 17.01% 21.26% 20.00% 21.26% 0.43% (0.6296) 0.42% (0.1379)
(0.4026) (0.1656) (0.1260) (0.2180) (0.3386) (0.1982) (0.7748)   (0.5781)  
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
From t=-3 to t=0 From t=0 to t=+2
% Change % Change
Table IV. Debt to Value Ratio.  
This table displays the median Debt to Value Ratio for a sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. ‘Europe’ 
includes firms from Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. ‘Asia’ includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. ‘Latin America’ includes firms from Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. The ratio equals Total Debt to Value (book value of equity 
plus debt). Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is calculated as follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the 
regression  st st o mt R R n g g + + = 1 , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and  st R  is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the 
g coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate  ( ) st 1 o mt mt R ˆ ˆ R F g + g - =  from 
the previous regression, and use the estimated residual in the regression  t ij t m
m
i t s
s
i o t ij j j F R R e + b + b + d = , where  ij R  is the stock return of firm I in the country j,  sj Ris 
the monthly change in the exchange rate in the country j, and 
j m F is the residual for market j. The measure of firm i's exposure to exchange rate risk is  s
i b . Tests of 
significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. We also include the p-value for a test of equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta 
firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test. 
       
Exchange Rate
Country Beta N t = - 3 t = - 2 t = - 1 t =  0 t = + 1 t = + 2 p-value p-value
Finland   24 51.33% 55.56% 60.94% 65.39% 58.51% 55.95% 13.19% *** (0.0059) -0.32% (0.4038)
Negative 16 42.71% 54.96% 64.66% 70.84% 58.51% 56.14% 17.51% * (0.0547) 0.08% (0.9097)
Positive 8 57.72% 64.13% 57.25% 57.62% 60.65% 55.14% 6.69% (0.1250) -5.02% (0.5469)
(0.6052) (0.7234) (0.5312) (0.4870) (0.4576) (0.2697) (0.5181) 61.58%
Italy   14 40.12% 49.24% 29.60% 16.67% 24.81% 38.59% 6.58% * (0.0781) 0.18% (0.8457)
Negative 10 56.39% 58.59% 48.45% 24.24% 32.64% 34.55% 6.60% (0.2500) -7.27% (0.3750)
Positive 4 0.99% 8.26% 7.41% 8.26% 24.81% 38.59% 1.40% (0.2500) 10.86% (0.2500)
(0.1116) (0.1116) (0.1360) (0.3036) (0.6824) (0.9436) (0.8597) 6.83% *
Norway   49 43.98% 36.31% 40.12% 48.72% 53.27% 45.06% -0.09% (0.7925) 0.42% (0.5108)
Negative 34 43.50% 36.86% 42.59% 47.33% 52.57% 42.19% 0.46% (0.6567) -2.48% (0.9096)
Positive 15 48.72% 36.31% 37.50% 49.24% 53.27% 47.09% -0.64% (1.0000) 2.91% (0.1937)
(0.8976) (0.6625) (0.3913) (0.7284) (0.8367) (0.9308) (0.6993) 28.29%
Spain   88 32.87% 32.89% 34.84% 41.18% 39.02% 39.94% 5.35% ** (0.0357) -0.14% (0.9697)
Negative 57 37.68% 34.21% 38.84% 43.50% 40.83% 40.12% 1.62% (0.1835) -1.23% (0.4956)
Positive 31 23.95% 27.79% 28.04% 37.09% 36.71% 39.02% 7.47% * (0.0921) 1.45% (0.4873)
(0.3112) (0.4029) (0.1714) (0.5409) (0.8515) (0.8923) (0.4516) 35.29%
Sweden   82 19.36% 16.67% 16.66% 21.26% 18.03% 22.46% 0.87% (0.2134) 0.05% (0.4164)
Negative 64 22.78% 20.00% 21.88% 24.81% 26.47% 28.57% -0.41% (0.3176) 2.91% (0.2061)
Positive 18 6.54% 6.54% 9.09% 8.66% 7.82% 5.59% 0.99% (0.3281) -0.99% * (0.0913)
(0.0304) ** (0.0079) *** (0.0057) *** (0.0445) ** (0.0743) * (0.0172) ** (0.4153) 13.18%
Turkey   37 21.88% 37.11% 26.33% 20.32% 29.58% 19.36% 8.75% (0.2121) 0.03% (0.2980)
Negative 4 43.18% 66.89% 57.85% 66.14% 49.97% 41.36% 13.47% (0.5000) -32.75% (0.2500)
Positive 33 17.36% 30.68% 18.37% 17.69% 22.48% 18.03% 8.75% (0.3484) 0.01% (0.8756)
(0.2580) (0.1747) (0.0712) * (0.0246) ** (0.0465) ** (0.2803) (0.7254) 3.35% **
United Kingdom   1,191 25.37% 30.07% 31.03% 30.56% 30.07% 28.57% 3.47% *** (<0.0001) 0.02% (0.6729)
Negative 1,011 25.93% 30.56% 31.51% 30.56% 30.56% 29.08% 3.73% *** (<0.0001) 0.01% (0.9561)
Positive 180 21.88% 25.08% 26.20% 28.57% 27.54% 26.74% 0.85% (0.1379) 0.04% (0.3290)
(0.2722) (0.0177) ** (0.1490) (0.5321) (0.3062) (0.3464) (0.1513) 45.69%
Indonesia   165 32.43% 33.11% 42.69% 47.92% 67.00% 77.01% 9.06% *** (<0.0001) 29.92% *** (<0.0001)
Negative 47 28.57% 28.06% 40.09% 45.94% 67.21% 77.12% 13.08% * (0.0595) 29.18% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 118 35.90% 35.48% 43.82% 48.45% 66.22% 76.99% 7.94% *** (<0.0001) 30.11% *** (<0.0001)
(0.1461) (0.2556) (0.5428) (0.9660) (0.7870) (0.8270) (0.4712) 94.30%
Korea   713 54.75% 55.95% 56.90% 58.68% 63.50% 55.16% 2.97% *** (<0.0001) -0.45% * (0.0610)
Negative 565 55.85% 56.52% 57.98% 60.32% 64.54% 56.14% 2.93% *** (<0.0001) -0.60% * (0.0531)
Positive 148 48.98% 52.60% 47.92% 50.25% 57.63% 51.10% 2.97% *** (0.0045) -0.12% (0.6724)
(0.0017) *** (0.0093) *** (0.0002) *** (0.0010) *** (0.0013) *** (0.0033) *** (0.9555) 70.77%
Malaysia   367 20.00% 22.48% 23.66% 29.58% 34.21% 37.89% 2.95% *** (<0.0001) 4.22% *** (<0.0001)
Negative 165 16.67% 20.00% 19.33% 28.06% 31.27% 36.31% 2.08% *** (0.0003) 4.79% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 202 24.24% 26.47% 28.06% 31.26% 36.31% 40.12% 5.09% *** (0.0001) 3.90% *** (<0.0001)
(0.1923) (0.2395) (0.1314) (0.2334) (0.1464) (0.4019) (0.7839) 61.97%
Philippines   153 9.09% 8.26% 12.28% 11.50% 21.26% 21.88% 0.03% (0.3399) 0.01% *** (<0.0001)
Negative 57 8.67% 1.96% 9.08% 1.96% 6.54% 14.53% 0.04% (0.1973) 0.01% *** (0.0004)
Positive 96 11.07% 10.71% 15.97% 20.26% 27.54% 26.20% 0.02% ** (0.0200) 0.02% *** (0.0061)
(0.9522) (0.6306) (0.3261) (0.0298) ** (0.0479) ** (0.2148) (0.0065) *** 17.45%
Singapore   209 21.26% 20.00% 25.09% 28.57% 33.33% 31.51% 2.75% *** (0.0000) 0.65% *** (0.0025)
Negative 174 21.26% 26.47% 27.54% 29.08% 33.33% 32.66% 3.36% *** (0.0000) 0.26% ** (0.0307)
Positive 35 21.26% 11.50% 19.68% 23.66% 30.34% 30.56% 0.00% (0.7238) 4.12% *** (0.0079)
(0.9948) (0.0141) ** (0.0180) ** (0.1451) (0.3873) (0.6645) (0.1460) 15.37%
Taiwan   320 37.89% 40.48% 47.09% 49.50% 59.68% 51.34% 5.58% *** (<0.0001) 4.07% *** (<0.0001)
Negative 218 37.50% 40.48% 47.09% 48.85% 57.08% 48.85% 4.98% *** (<0.0001) 2.69% *** (0.0002)
Positive 102 40.29% 40.12% 45.80% 50.50% 62.62% 55.25% 6.51% *** (0.0000) 5.17% *** (0.0001)
(0.8267) (0.4519) (0.5643) (0.9322) (0.3676) (0.6166) (0.4685) 48.14%
Thailand   154 28.31% 27.54% 26.74% 28.57% 28.06% 29.58% 0.93% (0.4472) 0.41% ** (0.0356)
Negative 14 27.01% 23.59% 25.37% 28.57% 24.81% 30.31% 0.57% (0.3125) 2.66% (0.3013)
Positive 140 28.57% 28.06% 27.01% 28.57% 29.08% 29.58% 1.26% (0.8021) 0.02% * (0.0734)
(0.4174) (0.2851) (0.8165) (0.8373) (0.8943) (0.2179) (0.3278) 47.99%
Brazil   15 18.51% 18.03% 22.48% 20.64% 25.48% 32.43% 0.07% (1.0000) 10.12% (0.0005)
Negative 5 11.50% 8.26% 23.08% 22.62% 21.88% 26.47% 0.78% (1.0000) 8.43% (0.1250)
Positive 10 22.48% 20.56% 20.26% 20.64% 29.08% 33.96% -1.68% (1.0000) 10.12% *** (0.0078)
(0.3827) (0.5613) (0.6098) (0.8170) (1.0000) (0.6682) (0.8026)   79.89%  
Mexico   29 31.51% 31.97% 36.71% 37.07% 45.06% 43.18% 9.43% ** (0.0210) 8.50% *** (<0.0001)
Negative 24 29.78% 31.51% 35.69% 34.64% 43.18% 38.99% 8.87% ** (0.0322) 8.07% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 5 42.86% 45.71% 47.64% 50.00% 65.19% 68.05% 11.69% (1.0000) 17.43% * (0.0625)
(0.5040) (0.3722) (0.2825) (0.1400) (0.1942) (0.1259) (0.3848) 3.65% **
Venezuela Positive 7 27.76% 31.03% 22.18% 26.17% 29.29% 21.88% -4.24% (1.0000) -3.91% (0.2969)
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
From t=-3 to t=0 From t=0 to t=+2
% Change % Change
Table IV b. Debt to Value Ratio at the country level.
This table displays the median Debt to Value Ratio for a sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. ‘Europe’ includes firms from Finland,
Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. ‘Asia’ includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. ‘Latin America’
includes firms from Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is calculated as follows: for every country in our sample,
we estimate the regression 
st st o mt R R n g g + + = 1
, where 
mt R
is the corresponding market return, and 
st R
 is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the
g
coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate 
( )
st 1 o mt mt R ˆ ˆ R F g + g - =
 from the previous regression,
and use the estimated residual in the regression 
t ij t m
m
i t s
s
i o t ij j j F R R e + b + b + d =
, where 
ij R
 is the stock return of firm I in the country j, 
sj R
is the monthly change in the exchange rate in the
country j, and 
j m F
is the residual for market j. The measure of firm i's exposure to exchange rate risk is  s
i b
. Tests of significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. We also include
the p-value for a test of equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test.      
Exchange Rate
Region Beta N t = - 3 t = - 2 t = - 1 t =  0 t = + 1 t = + 2 p-value p-value
Total 2,175 59.43% 67.96% 60.73% 58.63% 57.00% 56.70% 0.00% (0.1141) 0.00% (0.5679)
 
  Negative 1,603 58.18% 66.73% 58.56% 56.80% 54.91% 55.26% 0.00% * (0.0885) 0.00% (0.8855)
  Positive 572 64.17% 73.30% 67.15% 65.66% 60.76% 60.00% 0.00% (0.9284) 0.00% (0.1704)
(0.0074) *** (0.0675) * (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (0.0025) *** (0.0020) *** (0.5130)   (0.1992)  
   
Europe   993 52.76% 62.47% 54.22% 52.83% 48.83% 46.92% 0.00% (0.3051) -0.12% *** (0.0092)
     
Negative 829 51.79% 58.81% 53.03% 50.41% 47.88% 45.13% 0.00% (0.1382) 0.00% * (0.0947)
Positive 164 58.26% 73.44% 61.03% 66.65% 56.33% 52.63% 0.50% (0.3940) -1.37% *** (0.0079)
(0.1003) (0.1384) (0.0452) ** (0.0042) *** (0.0244) ** (0.2311) (0.1465)   (0.1021)  
Asia   1,113 63.38% 69.58% 64.55% 62.63% 62.61% 63.32% 0.00% (0.2876) 0.11% (0.1129)
     
Negative 724 62.85% 69.93% 63.02% 61.01% 62.10% 63.27% 0.00% (0.4667) 0.68% * (0.0936)
Positive 389 65.58% 68.42% 69.59% 65.81% 63.53% 63.71% 0.00% (0.4286) 0.00% (0.6997)
(0.3450) (0.9483) (0.0201) ** (0.0824) * (0.5040) (0.3068) (0.6986)   (0.4283)  
   
Latin America   69 60.46% 82.80% 66.48% 54.80% 53.45% 51.18% 0.43% (0.3674) 0.01% (0.8595)
     
Negative 50 59.76% 72.89% 66.61% 54.87% 54.02% 51.78% 0.53% (0.4127) 1.00% (0.2270)
Positive 19 63.97% 440.40% 59.89% 54.73% 52.47% 49.51% 0.43% (0.8125) -10.84% ** (0.0480)
(0.5906) (0.0012) *** (0.9179) (0.7391) (0.5538) (0.6329) (0.8715)   (0.0322) **
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
From t=-3 to t=0 From t=0 to t=+2
% Change % Change
Table V. Percentage of Short-Term Debt on Total Debt.
This table displays the ratio of Short-Term Debt to Total Debt for a sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000.
‘Europe’ includes firms from Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. ‘Asia’ includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. ‘Latin America’ includes firms from Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Firms are divided into two groups base on their
exchange rate beta, which is calculated as follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression  st st o mt R R n g g + + = 1 , where mt R is the corresponding
market return, and  st R  is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the g coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37
relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate  ( ) st 1 o mt mt R ˆ ˆ R F g + g - =  from the previous regression, and use the estimated residual in the regression
t ij t m
m
i t s
s
i o t ij j j F R R e + b + b + d = , where  ij R  is the stock return of firm I in the country j,  sj R is the monthly change in the exchange rate in the country j, and 
j m F is the
residual for market j. The measure of firm i's exposure to exchange rate risk is  s
i b . Stock returns, Exchange rates, Market Returns and accounting variables are from
Datastream. Tests of significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. We also include the p-value for a test of equal medians between negative and positive
exchange rate beta firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test.      
Exchange Rate
Region Beta N t = - 3 t = - 2 t = - 1 t =  0 t = + 1 t = + 2 p-value p-value
Total   2,018 10.23% 10.09% 9.38% 8.72% 8.20% 8.79% -13.57% *** (<0.0001) 0.37% *** (<0.0001)
Negative 1,508 9.95% 9.73% 8.91% 8.18% 7.79% 8.31% -15.08% *** (<0.0001) 0.01% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 510 12.17% 11.60% 11.15% 10.75% 9.49% 10.51% -8.18% *** (0.0070) 0.99% *** (0.0036)
(<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (0.0025) *** (0.8617)  
   
Europe   1,022 10.60% 10.29% 9.22% 8.38% 7.98% 8.16% -20.78% *** (<0.0001) -4.52% (0.4039)
   
  Negative 853 10.58% 10.23% 9.04% 8.21% 7.86% 8.07% -21.48% *** (<0.0001) -4.93% (0.4398)
  Positive 169 11.51% 10.66% 9.71% 9.17% 8.64% 8.86% -11.71% ** (0.0152) -2.76% (0.7518)
(0.6542) (0.5665) (0.1528) (0.0424) *** (0.0750) * (0.0300) ** (0.0179) ** (0.9189)  
Asia   908 9.61% 9.86% 9.67% 9.06% 8.54% 10.31% -8.68% *** (0.0003) 11.31% *** (<0.0001)
   
  Negative 586 8.97% 8.87% 8.83% 8.05% 7.71% 9.24% -9.74% *** (0.0012) 16.56% *** (<0.0001)
  Positive 322 12.34% 12.40% 11.73% 11.56% 10.30% 11.53% -6.40% * (0.0941) 6.03% *** (0.0009)
(<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (0.5924)   (0.1905)  
   
Latin America   88 10.02% 10.12% 9.28% 8.87% 7.62% 8.38% -8.71% (0.4574) -3.78% (0.1213)
     
  Negative 69 9.96% 10.13% 9.33% 8.44% 7.62% 8.02% -11.79% (0.2910) -8.19% (0.5248)
  Positive 19 12.96% 9.07% 9.22% 9.76% 7.84% 10.08% -1.41% (0.8203) 41.59% ** (0.0343)
(0.1884) (0.8432) (0.8765) (0.5778) (0.3535) (0.3277) (0.4517)   (0.1533)  
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
From t=-3 to t=0 From t=0 to t=+2
% Change % Change
Table VI. EBIT to Revenues Ratio.
This table displays the median EBIT to Revenues Ratio for a sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. ‘Europe’ includes firms
from Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. ‘Asia’ includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and
Thailand. ‘Latin America’ includes firms from Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is calculated as
follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression  st st o mt R R n g g + + = 1 , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and  st R  is the change in the exchange
rate for the same period. We estimate the g coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate
( ) st 1 o mt mt R ˆ ˆ R F g + g - =  from the previous regression, and use the estimated residual in the regression  t ij t m
m
i t s
s
i o t ij j j F R R e + b + b + d = , where  ij R  is the stock return of firm I in the
country j,  sj R is the monthly change in the exchange rate in the country j, and 
j m F is the residual for market j. The measure of firm i's exposure to exchange rate risk is  s
i b . Tests
of significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. We also include the p-value for a test of equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This
test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test.      
Exchange Rate
Region Beta N t = - 3 t = - 2 t = - 1 t =  0 t = + 1 t = + 2 p-value p-value
Total   3,696 9.80% 9.31% 8.54% 7.58% 6.56% 6.68% -27.19% *** (<0.0001) -19.59% *** (<0.0001)
           
Negative 2,626 10.27% 9.61% 8.68% 7.74% 6.77% 7.15% -28.06% *** (<0.0001) -16.25% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 1,070 7.83% 8.54% 8.24% 7.09% 5.92% 5.37% -23.69% *** (<0.0001) -32.38% *** (<0.0001)
(<0.0001) *** (0.0003) *** (0.2323) (0.0595) * (0.1323) (0.1323) *** (0.0885) * (0.0002) ***
               
Europe   1,393 19.64% 17.61% 14.33% 12.02% 11.39% 11.90% -33.26% *** (<0.0001) -7.80% *** (<0.0001)
               
Negative 1,131 19.89% 17.77% 14.51% 12.00% 11.25% 11.91% -34.30% *** (<0.0001) -6.74% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 262 18.04% 16.64% 13.92% 12.16% 11.91% 11.63% -32.53% *** (<0.0001) -10.72% *** (0.0042)
(0.7453) (0.7472) (0.3705) (0.6772)   (0.1228) (0.1323) (0.4934)   (0.2736)  
           
Asia   2,217 5.99% 6.68% 6.53% 6.01% 4.79% 4.00% -20.38% *** (<0.0001) -34.91% *** (<0.0001)
               
Negative 1,437 6.06% 6.62% 6.29% 5.88% 4.66% 4.11% -20.88% *** (<0.0001) -30.18% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 780 5.70% 6.89% 6.87% 6.23% 4.94% 3.79% -19.44% *** (<0.0001) -41.42% *** (<0.0001)
(0.8772) (0.0692) * (0.0053) *** (0.0344) ** (0.0345) ** (0.1323) (0.8837)   (0.0364) **
               
Latin America   86 17.32% 15.07% 13.63% 10.63% 7.15% 11.08% -35.48% *** (0.0002) -3.60% (0.9961)
               
Negative 58 17.32% 15.07% 12.24% 10.85% 7.59% 11.08% -35.48% *** (0.0001) -8.30% (0.3831)
Positive 28 17.24% 19.33% 17.44% 9.72% 4.12% 10.61% -17.71% (0.4961) 17.36% (0.1867)
(0.7898) (0.6064) (0.0488) ** (0.9118) (0.8443) (0.1323) (0.3943)   (0.1114)  
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
From t=-3 to t=0 From t=0 to t=+2
% Change % Change
Table VII. Return On Capital Employed.
This table displays the median Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) for a sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. ‘Europe’
includes firms from Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. ‘Asia’ includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Taiwan and Thailand. ‘Latin America’ includes firms from Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is
calculated as follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression  st st o mt R R n g g + + = 1 , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and  st R  is the change in
the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the  g coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month.
Next, we estimate  ( ) st 1 o mt mt R ˆ ˆ R F g + g - =  from the previous regression, and use the estimated residual in the regression  t ij t m
m
i t s
s
i o t ij j j F R R e + b + b + d = , where  ij R  is the stock
return of firm I in the country j,  sj R is the monthly change in the exchange rate in the country j, and  
j m F is the residual for market j. The measure of firm  i's exposure to
exchange rate risk is  s
i b . Stock returns, Exchange rates, Market Returns and accounting variables are from Datastream. Tests of significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed
rank test. We also include the p-value for a test of equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank
test.      
Exchange Rate
Region Beta N t = - 3 t = - 2 t = - 1 t =  0 t = + 1 t = + 2 p-value p-value
Total   2,907 1.38 1.38 1.35 1.33 1.25 1.27 -4.57% *** (0.0004) -3.43% *** (<0.0001)
Negative 2,025 1.40 1.38 1.33 1.32 1.26 1.27 -4.80% *** (0.0005) -2.12% *** (0.0020)
Positive 882 1.32 1.38 1.39 1.36 1.23 1.25 -3.85% (0.2655) -7.91% *** (0.0019)
(0.0332) ** (0.6448) (0.0790) * (0.0567) * (0.7461) (0.2969) (0.8773)   (0.0431) **
   
Europe   1,254 1.39 1.34 1.32 1.33 1.34 1.37 -2.73% (0.1450) 1.37% *** (0.0008)
   
Negative 1,019 1.39 1.34 1.32 1.34 1.35 1.37 -1.96% (0.7296) 0.95% ** (0.0406)
Positive 235 1.43 1.36 1.33 1.29 1.32 1.41 -7.32% *** (0.0036) 3.94% *** (0.0006)
(0.6215) (0.7654) (0.7256) (0.2417)   (0.5769) (0.5310) (0.0077) *** (0.0213) **
 
Asia 1,538 1.34 1.41 1.37 1.32 1.15 1.12 -6.77% *** (0.0019) -13.42% *** (<0.0001)
   
Negative 928 1.38 1.42 1.35 1.29 1.13 1.12 -9.67% *** (<0.0001) -10.50% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 610 1.28 1.36 1.40 1.42 1.19 1.12 -2.41% (0.7143) -17.79% *** (<0.0001)
(0.0492) ** (0.8304) (0.1459) (0.0043) *** (0.0355) ** (0.8826) (0.0250) ** (0.1025)  
     
Latin America 115 1.58 1.63 1.53 1.54 1.35 1.50 -4.47% (0.4372) -6.49% * (0.0733)
   
Negative 78 1.66 1.65 1.49 1.56 1.35 1.44 -5.56% (0.2613) -6.74% ** (0.0127)
Positive 37 1.36 1.61 1.72 1.49 1.43 1.69 4.29% (0.5678) 5.56% (0.6695)
(0.0567) * (0.9314) (0.0688) * (0.4607) (0.1031) (0.0966) * (0.2901)   (0.0903) *
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
From t=-3 to t=0 From t=0 to t=+2
% Change % Change
Table VIII. Current Ratio.
This table displays the median Current Assets to Current Liabilities Ratio for a sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000.
‘Europe’ includes firms from Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. ‘Asia’ includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. ‘Latin America’ includes firms from Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta,
which is calculated as follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression  st st o mt R R n g g + + = 1 , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and  st R  is the
change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the g coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation
month. Next, we estimate  ( ) st 1 o mt mt R ˆ ˆ R F g + g - =  from the previous regression, and use the estimated residual in the regression  t ij t m
m
i t s
s
i o t ij j j F R R e + b + b + d = , where  ij R  is the
stock return of firm I in the country j,  sj R is the monthly change in the exchange rate in the country j, and 
j m F is the residual for market j. The measure of firm i's exposure to
exchange rate risk is  s
i b . Stock returns, Exchange rates, Market Returns and accounting variables are from Datastream. Tests of significance are based on a Wilcoxon signed
rank test. We also include the p-value for a test of equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank
test.      
Exchange Rate
Region Beta N t = - 3 t = - 2 t = - 1 t =  0 t = + 1 t = + 2 p-value p-value
Total   1,663 5.11 3.79 3.07 2.84 2.98 3.79 -35.58% *** (<0.0001) 18.44% *** (<0.0001)
 
Negative 1,282 5.24 3.69 2.83 2.54 2.86 3.73 -37.21% *** (<0.0001) 21.34% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 381 4.49 3.95 3.96 3.70 3.38 3.90 -28.77% *** (<0.0001) 6.44% *** (0.0001)
(0.9228) (0.0147) ** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (0.0011) *** (0.1587) (0.0422) ** (0.0010) ***
Europe   1,117 7.52 5.28 4.26 4.06 4.27 5.33 -45.79% *** (<0.0001) 33.46% *** (<0.0001)
Negative 936 7.58 5.29 4.21 4.05 4.28 5.47 -46.74% *** (<0.0001) 32.33% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 181 6.89 5.02 4.53 4.34 4.05 4.96 -41.60% *** (0.0038) 37.81% *** (<0.0001)
(0.6189) (0.8635) (0.2404) (0.6763) (0.2555) (0.3102) (0.2047) (0.5246)
Asia   415 1.21 1.35 1.33 1.27 1.29 1.27 -14.38% *** (<0.0001) -9.10% (0.4628)
Negative 270 1.15 1.17 1.07 1.00 1.02 1.02 -14.36% *** (<0.0001) -4.82% (0.4779)
Positive 145 2.16 3.31 3.67 3.35 2.96 2.70 -16.37% (0.4311) -16.47% ** (0.0189)
(<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (0.5722) (0.0227) **
Latin America   131 3.02 3.18 2.48 2.22 2.13 2.72 -43.38% *** (0.0081) 15.08% *** (0.0033)
  Negative 76 3.23 3.39 2.38 2.00 1.84 2.16 -42.84% *** (0.0052) 11.82% ** (0.0429)
  Positive 55 2.74 2.87 2.65 3.06 2.62 3.38 -45.95% (0.4383) 23.88% ** (0.0266)
(0.6254) (0.2217) (0.1312) (0.0041) *** (0.0292) ** (0.0007) *** (0.3364) (0.6297)
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
From t=-3 to t=0 From t=0 to t=+2
% Change % Change
Table IX. Interest Coverage.
This table displays the median EBITDA to Interest  Expense for a sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. ‘Europe’ includes firms
from Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. ‘Asia’ includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.
‘Latin America’ includes firms from Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is calculated as follows: for every
country in our sample, we estimate the regression  st st o mt R R n g g + + = 1 , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and  st R  is the change in the exchange rate for the same period.
We estimate the g coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate  ( ) st 1 o mt mt R ˆ ˆ R F g + g - =  from the
previous regression, and use the estimated residual in the regression  t ij t m
m
i t s
s
i o t ij j j F R R e + b + b + d = , where   ij R  is the stock return of firm I in the country j,  sj R is the monthly change in
the exchange rate in the country j, and 
j m F is the residual for market j. The measure of firm i's exposure to exchange rate risk is  s
i b . Stock returns, Exchange rates, Market Returns and
accounting variables are from Datastream. Tests of significance are based on a t Wilcoxon signed rank test.are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. We also include the p-value for a
test of equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test.rank test. We also include the p-value for a test of
equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test.      
Exchange Rate
Region Beta N t = - 3 t = - 2 t = - 1 t =  0 t = + 1 t = + 2 p-value p-value
Total   2,565 15.59% 11.60% 8.61% 9.30% 3.05% 3.84% -62.41% *** (<0.0001) -92.84% *** (<0.0001)
 
Negative 1,937 14.99% 9.75% 6.56% 7.46% 2.52% 3.66% -67.46% *** (<0.0001) -92.07% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 628 17.76% 16.05% 13.23% 15.22% 4.16% 4.42% -47.89% *** (<0.0001) -95.46% *** (<0.0001)
(0.0003) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (0.0012) *** (0.2249) (0.0001) *** (0.8249)
Europe   1,363 15.99% 3.69% 1.57% 4.50% 6.11% 7.42% * -82.86% *** (<0.0001) -75.71% *** (<0.0001)
Negative 1,102 15.66% 2.20% 0.61% 3.81% 5.75% 6.34% -84.62% *** (<0.0001) -79.98% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 261 19.28% 9.13% 6.09% 7.23% 8.46% 10.32% -72.31% *** (<0.0001) -60.51% *** (<0.0001)
(0.0061) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (0.0011) *** (<0.0001) *** (0.1302) (0.0631) *
Asia   1,078 15.10% 16.41% 13.44% 12.99% 0.18% 0.00% -45.47% *** (<0.0001) -100.00% *** (<0.0001)
Negative 747 14.46% 15.79% 12.41% 10.60% -1.26% 0.00% -51.86% *** (<0.0001) -100.00% *** (<0.0001)
Positive 331 17.37% 17.95% 14.93% 17.86% 2.02% 0.00% -30.15% (0.1188) -100.00% *** (<0.0001)
(0.0531) * (0.0242) ** (0.0004) *** (<0.0001) *** (<0.0001) *** (0.7950) (0.0138) ** (0.2757)
Latin America   124 16.65% 16.26% 3.47% 11.45% 8.33% 9.95% -54.34% ** (0.0195) -80.83% *** (<0.0001)
  Negative 88 13.37% 13.43% 1.99% 10.19% 8.33% 8.42% -23.05% (0.1831) -73.79% *** (<0.0001)
  Positive 36 47.90% 30.14% 10.32% 24.37% 7.87% 13.39% -96.60% * (0.0532) -95.91% *** (0.0001)
(0.0010) *** (0.0013) *** (0.0112) ** (0.1407) (0.4395) (0.1365) (0.0692) * (0.1749)
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
From t=-3 to t=0 From t=0 to t=+2
% Change % Change
Table X. Changes in Net Investment.
This table displays the median change in net investment for a sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. ‘Europe’ includes firms from
Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. ‘Asia’ includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. ‘Latin
America’ includes firms from Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is calculated as follows: for every country in
our sample, we estimate the regression  st st o mt R R n g g + + = 1 , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and  st R  is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We
estimate the  g coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate  ( ) st 1 o mt mt R ˆ ˆ R F g + g - =  from the
previous regression, and use the estimated residual in the regression  t ij t m
m
i t s
s
i o t ij j j F R R e + b + b + d = , where   ij R  is the stock return of firm I in the country j,  sj R is the monthly change in
the exchange rate in the country j, and 
j m F is the residual for market j. The measure of firm i's exposure to exchange rate risk is  s
i b . Stock returns, Exchange rates, Market Returns and
accounting variables are from Datastream. Tests of significance are based on a t Wilcoxon signed rank test.are based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test. We also include the p-value for
a test of equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test.rank test. We also include the p-value for a test
of equal medians between negative and positive exchange rate beta firms. This test is based on a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test.Variable Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Intercept -0.2320 ** (0.0191) -0.0665 *** (0.0014) -0.4672   (0.1057) 4.3429 *** (0.0013)
Average Debt to Equity Ratio 0.0092   (0.1429) 0.0868 * (0.0786) -0.0132 * (0.0989)
Debt to Equity Ratio for  -0.1939 * (0.0814) -2.8769 * (0.0675) -6.0641 *** (0.0016)
Debt to Equity Ratio for  -0.9166   (0.1924) -5.5980 (0.1134) -1.7423 ** (0.0127)
Corruption Index (Lower Score, High Corruption) -0.0905 ** (0.0363) -1.8915 *** (0.0070)
Efficiency of Judicial System 0.0276 *** (0.0036) -0.2060 (0.1457)
GDP -0.0003 *** (<0.0001) 0.0031 ** (0.0282)
Rule of Law 0.0613 *** (0.0078) 0.9184 ** (0.0160)
Legal Mother is Germany -0.2841 ** (0.0407) 1.4069 (0.1508)
Legal Mother is Spain and France -0.2964 ** (0.0175) 0.9175 (0.2258)
Legal Mother is United Kingdom -0.0938 ** (0.0106) 1.0146 (0.1168)
Legal Mother is Scandinavia -0.1684 ** (0.0130) -1.9114 (0.1454)
 
Number of Observations 17 17 17 17 17 17
Adjusted R-squared -0.0660 0.1148   -0.1642 0.4998 0.5077 0.6615
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
Panel II: Capital Structure, Corporate Governance Variables, and Macro Variables
Model XI Model XII __________________ __________________
Variable Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Intercept -0.2582 ** (0.0106) -0.1544 ** (0.0138) -0.1459 *** (0.0091) -0.3464   (0.1393) -0.5731 * (0.0533)
Average Debt to Equity Ratio -0.3016   (0.1243) -0.4097   (0.1681)
Debt to Equity Ratio for  -0.4822   (0.1745) -0.0939   (0.7132) -0.3243 * (0.0957)
Debt to Equity Ratio for  -0.2952   (0.2424) -0.0332 * (0.0549) 0.3362   (0.2556)
Corruption Index (Lower Score, High Corruption) -0.0495 ** (0.0431) 0.0151 *** (0.0047)
Efficiency of Judicial System 0.0039 *** (0.0048) 0.0003 *** (<0.0001)
GDP 1.4009   (0.5993) 0.0002 *** (<0.0001) 0.0003 *** (0.0000) 0.0002 *** (<0.0001) 0.0390 ** (0.0138)
Rule of Law 0.0549 *** (0.0093)
Legal Mother is Germany -0.2400 ** (0.0243)
Legal Mother is Spain and France -0.2961 ** (0.0160)
Legal Mother is United Kingdom -0.0952 *** (0.0080)
Legal Mother is Scandinavia -0.1324 ** (0.0100)
Current Account Deficit One Year Prior to Crisis 0.34078 *** (<0.0001) 0.7805   (0.2774) 0.7319   (0.2532) 0.0899   (0.6886) -0.0484   (0.5392) 0.4323   (0.1982)
Budget Deficit One Year Prior to Crisis 0.02166 *** (<0.0001) 0.0126 *** (<0.0001) 0.0145 *** (<0.0001) 0.0127 *** (<0.0001) 0.0151 *** (<0.0001) 0.0089 *** (<0.0001)
 
Number of Observations 17 17 17 17 17 17
Adjusted R-squared 0.3851 0.1112 0.6113   -0.1527 0.4816 0.5447  
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
__________________ Model VII __________________ __________________ __________________
__________________ __________________ __________________
Model IX Model X Model VIII
__________________ __________________
              Panel I: Capital Structure and Corporate Governance Variables
Model I __________________ Model V Model III Model IV Model II Model VI
b b x
+ +
b b x
- -
Table XI. Currency Depreciation and Firm Leverage. 
This table reports the results of the regression of the amount of depreciation from months t = -2 to t = +2 on the variables listed under the variables column for countries that have 
suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is calculated as follows: for every country in our 
sample, we estimate the regression  st st o mt R R n g g + + = 1 , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and  st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate 
the g coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate  ( ) st 1 o mt mt R ˆ ˆ R F g + g - =  from the previous 
regression, and use the estimated residual in the regression  t ij t m
m
i t s
s
i o t ij j j F R R e + b + b + d = , where  ij R  is the stock return of firm I in the country j,  sj Ris the monthly change in the 
exchange rate in the country j, and 
j m F is the residual for market j. The measure of firm i's exposure to exchange rate risk is  s
i b . Exchange rates and accounting variables are from 
Datastream. The variables “Rule of Law”, “Corruption”, “Risk of Expropriation”, and “Efficiency of the Judicial System” are from La Porta et al. (1998). GDP data is obtained 
from Economist Intelligence Unit database. P-values, T-Statistics and Standard Errors have been corrected for heteroskedasticity following the approach in White (1980). 
b b x
+ +
b b x
- -
b b x
+ + b b x
- -Latin America Asia Europe
Variable Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Intercept 0.1646 *** (0.0028) 0.5092 *** (0.0000) 0.1706 *** (<0.0001)
Exchange Rate Beta -1.46E-07 *** (0.0001) -1.34E-07 *** (0.0008) -1.12E-07 *** (<0.001) -3.95E-08   (0.2321) -1.90E-02 *** (0.0001) -3.16E-02 *** (0.0022)
Firm Size 0.0232 *** (<0.0001) 0.0230 *** (<0.0001) 0.0238 *** (<0.001) -0.0542 ** (0.0242) 0.0352 *** (0.0003) -0.0021   (0.3751)
EBIT / Total Assets -2.60E-06 ** (0.0191) -2.57E-06 ** (0.0212) -2.48E-06 (0.6520) 3.90E-03 (0.4226) (<0.0001) *** (0.0001) -1.17E-03 * (0.0606)
Market to Book Ratio 0.0025 *** (0.0091) 0.0023 ** (0.0134) 0.0022 * (0.0765) 0.0000 (0.4759) -0.0030 (0.3132) 0.1601 *** (<0.0001)
Corruption Index (Lower Score, High Corruption) -0.2011 *** (<0.0001) -0.1734 *** (0.0056)
Efficiency of Judicial System -0.0123   (0.1050) -0.0100   (0.2243)
Enforceability of Contracts 0.0829 * (0.0587) -0.0411   (0.3758)
Log GDP per Capita 0.2890 *** (<0.0001) 0.2573 *** (<0.0001)
Risk of Expropriation (Lower Score, High Risk) -0.7698 *** (<0.0001) -0.5784 *** (0.0004)
Government Repudiation of Contracts (Lower Score, High Risk) -0.0255   (0.1426) 0.0251   (0.2811)
Rule of Law 0.1292 *** (<0.0001) 0.0749 ** (0.0321)
Dummy for Asian Countries 0.0378   (0.3313) 0.0511   (0.3626)
Dummy for European Countries -0.3145 *** (0.0009) -0.2046   (0.1961)
Dummy for Latin American Countries -0.6093 *** (<0.0001) -0.4920 ** (0.0251)
Legal Mother is Germany -0.1817 ** (0.0480)
Legal Mother is France and Spain -0.1466   (0.1495)
Legal Mother is United Kingdom -0.1023 ** (0.0353)
Number of Observations 1,601 1,601 1,601 53 856 689
R-square 0.7805 0.7805 0.9656 0.0518 0.0624 0.3470
*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels or better, respectively.
Model VI __________________ Model IV __________________ Model V __________________ Model I Model II Model III __________________ __________________ __________________
Table XII. Firm Leverage and Currency Exposure. 
This table reports the results of the regression of a firm’s debt-to-value ratio on the variables listed under the variables column for countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 
1985-2000. Europe’ includes firms from Finland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. ‘Asia’ includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan and Thailand. ‘Latin America’ includes firms from Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is calculated as follows: 
for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression  st st o mt R R n g g + + = 1 , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and  st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. 
We estimate the g coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate  ( ) st 1 o mt mt R ˆ ˆ R F g + g - =  from the previous 
regression, and use the estimated residual in the regression  t ij t m
m
i t s
s
i o t ij j j F R R e + b + b + d = , where  ij R  is the stock return of firm I in the country j,  sj Ris the monthly change in the exchange rate 
in the country j, and 
j m F is the residual for market j. The measure of firm i's exposure to exchange rate risk is  s
i b . Exchange rates and accounting variables are from Datastream. The variables 
“Log GDP per capita”, “Rule of Law”, “Corruption”, and “Efficiency of the Judicial System” are from La Porta et al. (1998). P-values have been corrected for heteroskedasticity following the 
approach in White (1980). All R-squares are adjusted. Model III is estimated with country-fixed effects. The coefficient for the exchange rate beta variable has been multiplied by 
6 10 . 
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Figure 1 
Exchange Rate Changes before Currency Crises 
The graph shows the average appreciation / depreciation  of the nominal exchange rate 
US dollar / domestic currency in the 72 months preceding the currency crises in Latin 
America (Brazil, Mexico,  and Venezuela), Europe (Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom), Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand), considered in the paper.  
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